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Existing scrubbing techniques for SEU mitigation on FPGAs do not guarantee
an error-free operation after SEU recovering if the affected configuration bits do
belong to feedback loops of the implemented circuits. In this paper, we a) provide
a netlist-based circuit analysis technique to distinguish so-called critical configura-
tion bits from essential bits in order to identify configuration bits which will need
also state-restoring actions after a recovered SEU and which not. Furthermore, b)
an alternative classification approach using fault injection is developed in order to
compare both classification techniques. Moreover, c) we will propose a floorplanning
approach for reducing the effective number of scrubbed frames and d), experimen-
tal results will give evidence that our optimization methodology not only allows to
detect errors earlier but also to minimize the Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR) of a
circuit considerably. In particular, we show that by using our approach, the MTTR
for datapath-intensive circuits can be reduced by up to 48.5 % in comparison to
standard approaches.
Keywords: Single Event Upsets, FPGA Scrubbing, Configuration Bit Partitioning, Floorplan-
ning, Fault Injection
1 Introduction
The application areas of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) have steadily grown over
the last two decades. Initially, FPGAs were intended to replace CPLDs to implement simple
glue logic functions, but today’s SRAM-based FPGAs are able to host entire multi-core systems
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on a single chip. By now, FPGAs play a major role for implementing complex digital systems
for telecommunication networks, software-defined radios, and computer vision. The success in
these application areas makes FPGAs also interesting for new safety-critical applications and
application fields, like in space missions or avionics, which are still in the hand of traditional
ASICs. However, in these new operation sites, FPGAs have to deal with harsh environments,
and the implemented systems are forced to guarantee a high reliability.
Today, most advanced SRAM-based FPGA devices such as the Xilinx Virtex-7 family offer
up to 2 million logic cells. On the other hand, these huge numbers of FPGA resources must
be configured which results in bitstream sizes of up to 55 MB [40]. In fact, this makes current
FPGA devices to some of the largest SRAM chips available [15]. This development was only
possible by advances in manufacturing process technology to ever-smaller scales. In general,
the SRAM-cells of an SRAM chip are susceptible to effects of cosmic ray particles, which can
lead to so called Single Event Upsets (SEUs), a bit-flip of the stored value in one SRAM-cell.
Although, the charges stored in SRAM-cells decrease with every new technology generation,
the susceptibility to SEU of one SRAM-cell has been lowered or has been held constant at
least [42]. Nonetheless, since the number of SRAM-cells per FPGA-device has been increased
significantly, the probability that an SEU occurs during operation of the FPGA device has been
increased. This makes SEUs an important reliability issue, especially in harsh radiation-prone
environments like space applications. Here, SEUs impose a well-established concern, but they
receive increasing concern also for safety-critical terrestrial applications such as systems for
medical, automotive, and power generation applications.
To prevent the accumulation of SEUs, well-known frame-based scrubbing techniques [6] can be
successfully applied. Scrubbing allows the recovery from errors induced by SEUs by periodically
or error-triggered frame-wise overwriting of configuration bits with the unfalsified values.
However, most of these approaches do not take into account that SEUs have varying impacts
on the implemented logic. Even in large designs, only a minority of the configuration bits is used
and, therefore, have influence on the implemented functionality. SEUs on unused configuration
bits may obviously be ignored. However, SEUs on unused configuration bits might create some
ghost circuits which might increase the FPGA power consumption, but have no influence on
the functionality of the design. Moreover, SEUs on used configuration bits may also have
varying impacts on the circuit behavior and may demand different error-handling methods. In
particular, not all SEU-induced errors may be corrected only by the application of scrubbing.
Indeed, components of a circuit involved in feedback paths might still and infinitely cause a
malfunction due to corrupted states even if scrubbing is applied to the involved configuration
frames.
In this paper, we present an automatic partitioning approach which categorizes primitive
cells and nets at logic level into essential and critical cells, respectively nets. Functional er-
rors caused by SEUs on configuration bits of essential, but non-critical primitive cells and nets
may be corrected by scrubbing without any further actions. For SEUs on configuration bits of
critical primitive cells and nets, further actions, like resetting the registers, must be performed
additionally to scrubbing. Some related work using the terms sensitive and persistent instead of
essential and critical, e.g., [25]. In addition to this automatic netlist partitioning as illustrated
in Fig. 1, we propose advanced floorplanning methods to reduce the overall number of frames
which have to be scrubbed. As an important side effect, this also may lead to a reduction of
the Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR) of a given system due to shorter scrubbing cycles. Further-
more, by knowing the classification of each configuration bit, the number of time-consuming
state-restoring actions, like global resets of the circuit, are reduced, since not every SEU will
demand such actions after scrubbing. A set of experiments will give evidence that the pro-
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Figure 1: Illustration of our two step approach. In the partitioning step, the primitive cells of the
netlist, e.g., LUTs and flip-flops, and nets are categorized into essential (black) and
critical (red) cells, nets respectively in order to identify and distinguish the associated
essential and critical bits. In the floorplanning step, the primitive cells are placed
and routed such to minimize the number of occupied configuration frames by using
of special placement and routing constraints.
posed technique may indeed reduce the downtime of a system considerably. Furthermore, an
alternative classification approach by utilizing fault injection experiments is presented and a
comparison to the introduced automatic partitioning approach is provided.
Circuits for the control path consist in general of more feedback loops compared to datapath-
intensive circuits. In harsh environments, like space applications, the control-intensive part is
mostly implemented into radiation hardened external microprocessors. Therefore, our focus
is on FPGA-based datapath-intensive circuits which are common in digital signal processing
applications.
This paper extends a preliminary publication [32] in the following major aspects: Apart from
the presentation of an automated netlist classification and floorplanning method, the design flow
in Section 7 and an alternative fault injection classification approach in Section 8 are introduced,
followed by a comparative study of the results of both classification techniques in Section 9.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses related work in the
field. The problem statement and target applications are described in Section 3. In Section 4
and Section 5, we provide formal definitions to describe the correlation between netlist primitive
cells, respectively nets and the corresponding configuration bits. Furthermore, we introduce
our definition of the MTTR. Our methodology is described in detail in Section 6, whereas the
design flow to implement our efficient SEU scrubbing method is presented in Section 7. Section
8 describes the implementation of an alternative classification approach by using fault injection.
In Section 9, we present experimental results and Section 10 concludes the paper.
3
2 Related Work
Previous research has studied the impact of SEUs on SRAM FPGA devices1 [5, 12, 19]. Many
techniques have been proposed to provide highly reliable FPGA devices, e.g., radiation-hardened
FPGAs2, to lower the effect of radiation-induced SEUs. However, radiation-hardened SRAM
FPGAs typically have a lower density compared to non radiation-hardened FPGAs, and they
only lower the probability of SEUs and do not completely avoid them. A comparison between
a radiation-hardened FPGA (Virtex-5QV) and a standard FPGA (Kintex-7) was done in [8].
Even on radiation-hardened FPGAs, the SEU rate in a low-earth orbit can be up to 16 events
per day for a Virtex-4QV [30] and up to 1.2 events per day for a Virtex-5QV [9]. Hence in space
missions, SEU correction mechanisms become essential to avoid the accumulation of latent faults
and ensure correct operation of an FPGA.
A wide variety of other SEU fault mitigation techniques for SRAM-based FPGAs have been
proposed during the past years. These techniques can be categorized into module redundancy
techniques, e.g., Dual Module Redundancy (DMR), Triple Module Redundancy (TMR) [22, 33,
3], N Module Redundancy (NMR), and techniques that use scrubbing of the FPGA configuration
memory [10, 41, 31]. Also, the combination of both techniques has been shown to be able to
increase the reliability of the FPGA modules significantly [27]. FPGA-based TMR approaches
replicate a given module which shall be protected either statically [33] or dynamically [3].
However, TMR techniques are known to often cause an excessive and unacceptable overhead
in terms of power consumption and area. Since the intensity of cosmic rays is not constant
but may vary over several magnitudes depending on the solar activity, a worst-case radiation
protection is far too expensive in most cases. A self-adaptive system is proposed in [9], which
monitors the current SEU rate and exploits the opportunity of partial reconfiguration of FPGAs
to implement redundancy such as TMR on demand. Furthermore, the possibility to partially
reconfigure the FPGA could also be exploited to repair faulty modules (single TMR instances)
through reconfiguration which may be identified by a majority voter [7]. Hereby, it is necessary
that the modules do not include any feedback paths. Otherwise, costly state recovering actions
must be applied.
Scrubbing techniques can also be categorized into blind and non-blind scrubbing. Blind scrub-
bing refreshes the configuration memory in a periodically manner without any error detection.
Non-blind scrubbing, however, refreshes the configuration only once an SEU is detected. Com-
monly, the error detection of non-blind scrubbing is achieved by a frame-by-frame readback with
Error Correction Code (ECC) checking [41]. In addition, a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)
over the complete array of frames is used for a fast detection of errors in the configuration mem-
ory. In [29] and [28], an approach called partial TMR is described in which TMR is selectively
applied to a given design to keep the overhead small due to the triplication of combinatorial
and sequential logic. To identify locations requiring triplication, the authors propose a netlist
analysis. In our approach, also a netlist analysis is proposed, however, in order to identify the
configuration bits of critical primitive instances and critical nets rather than places for module
triplication. Finally, in [31], the authors propose to use placement constraints aligned to the
frame boundaries to minimize the number of frames with essential bits which is similar to our
minimization approach. However, they do not actively manipulate the routing. Moreover, the
characterization of essential and critical bits is not considered in their work.
1The configuration memory of flash-based FPGAs like the FPGAs of the Microsemi ProAsic3 family is immune to SEUs.
However, in general, flash-based FPGAs have a significant lower logic density in comparison to SRAM-based FPGAs
[1].
2Examples are Xilinx Virtex-4QV [38], Xilinx Virtex-5QV [39], Microsemi RTG4 [23], and the NanoXplore NXT-32000
[20].
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3 Problem Statement
In general, SEUs in the configuration memory are considered as soft errors. A bit-flip in the
configuration memory does not cause a permanent and non-recoverable defect, since it does
not damage the SRAM cell itself, but corrupts its stored data. A typical manifestation of an
SEU-related error is an altered LUT function or signal route. A circuit design may be simply
corrected by overwriting the corresponding memory cell with the correct value. However, the
configuration bits of an FPGA are typically written once at the FPGA boot-up time and are
never changed or refreshed during operation. Therefore, without any SEU correction mecha-
nism, the output errors induced by SEUs appear to be permanent. In this context, we do not
consider SEUs, which change the state of the user-logic flip-flops directly, since they do not
change the configuration of an FPGA.
As described in Section 2, SEUs can be corrected by scrubbing techniques. However, this
takes some detection and correction time, in which the circuit might also produce and store
wrong results in registers. If the circuit netlist is free of cycles, no further actions have to be
carried out after scrubbing. However, if the circuit contains any feedback cycles, a recovery of
the circuit after scrubbing can only be achieved by resetting all registers to an initial state or
by replacing the register values by values saved at checkpoints during an uncorrupted circuit
behavior. Nevertheless, the application has to tolerate such a behavior by invalidating cor-
rupt output data. Streaming and packet-based applications, in which video, audio, or wireless
communication data are processed, usually may tolerate such behavior as well as partially cor-
rupted outputs since data may also be corrupted by interference of wireless transmissions and,
therefore, error correction schemes must always be present.
One example is the receiver chain of a communication satellite presented in [8]. A demod-
ulator, including frequency conversion, filtering, and demapping of a Quadrature Phase-Shift
Keying (QPSK) modulation is followed by a deinterleaver and a Low-Density-Parity-Check
(LDPC). An erroneous output of this receiver chain might be tolerated for a short period of
time due to implemented error handling in upper layers of the communication protocol. Note
that control intensive designs might not tolerate such a behavior. Therefore, our approach
focuses on data paths which are implemented in a stream-based manner. By combining our
approach with TMR, also applications can be supported which do not tolerate this limitation.
One important reliability metric is the Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR). Consider a system
model that tolerates corrupt outputs for short times and rollbacks to former saved checkpoints.
In that case, the MTTR is the period of time in which the circuit may deliver corrupt output
values. Therefore, a reduction of the MTTR will be of great benefit increasing the overall
circuit reliability. On the other hand, the MTTR is closely related to the Mean-Time-To-
Failure (MTTF) since repair actions have to be taken only if a failure occurs. According to [27],
the SEU-related MTTF depends on the SEU rate µFPGA of the FPGA’s configuration memory
and the probability that an SEU hits an essential bit. The SEU rate µFPGA depends on the
FPGA device3 and the environment4.
3The main factors of the SEU sensitivity of FPGA devices are the technology parameters (mainly Vdd and the structure
size), the die size, and the number of configuration bits [27].
4The most important parameter of the environment is the particle flux that is environmental-dependent (ground or
different orbits for space applications). A tool to estimate the SEU rate µ of semiconductor devices in SEUs/device/s
for different orbits is CREME96 [36]. The MTTF differences between space and ground conditions for the same design
and device can vary in the range of several magnitudes. Therefore, the MTTR reduction is utmost important, especially
for space applications with high SEU rates of up to several SEUs per day, even on radiation-hardened FPGAs [30]
5
4 Definitions w.r.t. Partitioning and Floorplanning
In order to explain our MTTR minimization approach, we first introduce some formal definitions
to clarify the dependency between configuration bits and different FPGA resources which is later
used to describe our SEU-aware FPGA design flow in detail in Section 7.
During automatic partitioning, we analyze the logic-level netlist of a given digital circuit after
logic synthesis. The resulting logic-level netlist is usually given in a structured text format and
consists of instances of primitive cells, e.g., LUTs, flip-flops, I/Os, block memories (BRAM),
embedded multipliers and nets. One illustration of an netlist is show in Fig. 2 a). The netlist
can be equivalently described by a directed graph G(V,E) with the set of nodes V and the
set of edges E. The instances of primitive cells correspond to the nodes v ∈ V and the nets
correspond to edges e ∈ E of the graph, respectively. As illustrated in Fig. 2 b), nets with
more than one sink are described by multiple directed edges between the source primitive cell
and the corresponding sink primitive cells. Therefore, each edge e = (vi, vj) ∈ E is directed
from vi ∈ V to vj ∈ V . Between any ordered pair of nodes, there exists at most one directed
edge. A sequence of edges p = (e1, e2, e3, ..., en) with ei = (vi−1, vi) is called a path. p is called
a cycle, if v0 = vn. We define the set K as the set of nodes v ∈ V contained in at least one
cycle. Furthermore, we call edge (vj , vi) out-edge for the node vj and in-edge for node vi. The
set E−(v) contains all out-edges and the set E+(v) all in-edges of node v. If E+(v) = {}, then
v is called primary input node and v ∈ PI, and PI is called the set of primary input nodes.
If E−(v) = {}, then v is called primary output node and v ∈ PO, and PO denotes the set of
primary output nodes.
Finally, as illustrated in Fig. 2 b), all nodes and edges will be called essential. Moreover, we
define all paths p to be critical if for p holds that the first node v0 is a primary input (v0 ∈ PI)
and the last node vn belongs to a cycle (vn ∈ K). All nodes and edges belonging to critical
paths will be called critical as well. As a result, the set of critical nodes and edges forms a
subset of the set of essential nodes and edges.
During the FPGA implementation process, the instances of the primitive cell types lookup
table, flip-flop, as well as carry logic cells are first mapped into device-specific basic resource
instances ρ of type τρ = slice which are called CLB (configurable logic blocks) slices in case of
Xilinx FPGAs. For example, a single Xilinx CLB slice consists of several lookup tables, flip-flops,
carry logic, and multiplexers as well as corresponding nets ECLB connecting them. Typically,
a single instance ρ of type τρ = slice is able to implement several nodes v as well as nets e
between these nodes if the required routing resources are present and available. Furthermore,
all embedded hard macros, like multipliers, block memory, DCMs, will also be mapped into
corresponding device-specific basic resource instances ρ of types τρ ∈ {mult, bram, dcm, . . . }.
After placing the instances ρ, the unrouted nets Econ = E \ ECLB will be routed. Each routed
net e ∈ Econ typically occupies several instances ρ of type programmable interconnect points
(PIPs) (τρ = pip) which are the basic instances of the interconnect network.
Technically, each instance ρ is configured by a set of configuration bits Bρ ⊂ Bconf with Bconf
being the union of all configuration bits of the configuration memory of a given FPGA device.
We define the mapping of the instance ρ to the set of configuration bits Bρ by introducing the
function fmapb such that
Bρ = fmapb (ρ) . (1)
In general, this mapping is proprietary and usually unknown to the circuit designer. In Xilinx
FPGAs, the configuration memory is usually organized as a column-based array of equally
sized frames which we unify in the set F . One frame fi ∈ F represents the smallest addressable
6
LUT
LUT
LUT
LUT
LUT
LUT
FF
FFFF
FFFF
FF
FFFF
FFFF
a)
b)
I/O
I/O
I/O
I/O
I/O
I/O
PO
PI
critical nodes &
edges
essential nodes &
edges
Figure 2: Illustration of the logic-level netlist analysis to identify critical primitive instances
and nets in the set of essential primitive instances and nets. The netlist in a) is
converted to the directed graph G(E, V ) in b) with the primary input nodes PI and
the primary output nodes PO. Critical primitive instances and nets are marked red.
Critical primitive instances reside on either cycles or on feed-forward paths into cycles
and each net which is fed into a critical primitive instance is itself critical [32].
segments of the configuration memory. For Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGAs, a frame has a height of one
clock region and the width of one bit. We denote all bits which belong to one frame fi as Bfi.
We define
Bconf =
Nfr,total−1⋃
i=0
Bfi (2)
with Nfr,total being the total number of configuration frames which depends on the size and type
of the FPGA device. Now note that the set of used configuration bits Bρ for implementing an
instance ρ might be spread over several configuration frames fi with
fi ∈ frames (Bρ) and i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Nfr,total − 1}, (3)
whereat frames (Bρ) denotes the set of frames which contain configuration bits of instance ρ.
For example, the bits which configure a Xilinx CLB slice are distributed over 36 subsequent
frames for a Virtex-6 FPGA [16]. However, because of the vertical frame structure, one frame
also spans over several CLB slices.
In this context, we define Nfr,used to be the number of frames containing configuration bits
used in a given design. Furthermore, the set of configuration bits Bconf can be partitioned
into the set of unused bits Bu, a set of essential bits Be used in a design and a set of critical
configuration bits Bc as a subset of Be with the distinction that critical bits belong to those
instances ρ of a circuit that do occur in feedback paths:
Bconf = Bu ∪Be and Bc ⊆ Be. (4)
Also, we let ne = |Be|, respectively nc = |Bc| denote the number of essential and critical bits.
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5 Definitions w.r.t. Reliability
Traditional scrubbing methods suffer from a long MTTR, since these techniques check and
refresh the complete configuration memory frame-by-frame which can take up tens to hundreds
of milliseconds [41]. Furthermore, by not knowing the criticality of a corrupted bit, the worst
case has to be assumed and state-restoring actions, like a global reset or checkpoint restoring,
have to be processed as well. This may further increases the MTTR, first by the time trestore
needed to perform state-restoring actions and second by the time tlost for reprocessing the lost
data. According to [31], the MTTR can be therefore defined by
MTTR = MTTD + trepair + trestore + tlost , (5)
where MTTD denotes the mean time to detect an SEU and trepair is the time to repair an
SEU-corrupted frame. For essential, but non-critical configuration bits b ∈ Be \ Bc, we need
no state-restoring actions which means that trestore and tlost are zero. For continuous scrubbing
methods, the MTTD can be defined as
MTTD = tcheck · 1
2
·Nfr,used, (6)
where Nfr,used is the number of frames which have to be verified and tcheck is the time to
determine if one frame is corrupted or not.
6 Proposed approach
Now, in order to decrease the MTTR, we first distinguish and identify automatically critical
bits from essential bits to reduce the number of state-restoring actions. Second, we try to
minimize the number of frames Nfr,used which have to be verified. We achieve the first goal
by netlist analysis with subsequent partitioning of primitive cells v and nets e into critical and
non-critical cells and nets (see Section 6.1). With the help of the Xilinx tool bitgen, we are
able to determine the corresponding critical bits in a given bitfile (see Section 7). The great
advantage of our method over previous fault-injection approaches like [18, 25], is the automatic
determination of critical bits without requiring any time-consuming bit-wise fault injection
and complex verification techniques. Furthermore, after identifying the critical cells and nets
at logic level, we manipulate the placement and routing to minimize Nfr,used. Verifying and
correcting bits can only be done frame-wise by reading or writing whole frames. Therefore, the
second goal, the reduction of the number of occupied frames Nfr,used, is achieved by manipulated
floorplanning in such a way that a high frame utilization is achieved (see Section 6.2).
6.1 Analysis of Logic-Level Netlist
The aim of the following netlist analysis is to identify exactly those instances of primitive cells
and nets which may lead to a permanent corrupt state of the circuit even if scrubbing would be
applied to the SEU-corrupted configuration memory. According to Section 4, these instances
and nets are obviously located in the netlist in either feedback cycles or on the corresponding
input paths to feedback cycles denoted as critical instances and nets since a malfunction of these
instances or an error in the routing of these nets may lead to erroneous state being trapped
in the corresponding cycle. An SEU occurring in any configuration bit of those components
demands a special treatment after correction, like a circuit reset into a valid or fail-save state.
Hence, we defined these configuration bits as critical configuration bits in Section 4. However,
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such state-restoring actions are not necessary in case an SEU hits a configuration bit belonging
to a non-critical essential bit.
6.2 Minimization of the number of used frames Nfr,used
Typically, traditional scrubbing methods verify all Nfr,total frames of the configuration memory,
but since only Nfr,used configuration frames contain essential bits, we suggest to read-back and
verify only these Nfr,used frames with Nfr,used < Nfr,total. However, if no constraints are used for
resource placement and routing, many of the used frames may be low-utilized by essential bits
and may be scattered all over the FPGA.
Therefore, by imposing allocation area constraints during the placement process, we first
propose to align the used resources of the FPGA device to frame boundaries as illustrated in
Fig. 3 b). To determine the needed number of frames inside a rectangular allocation area,
we use the number of utilized resources from the synthesis report. Furthermore, the nearest
location to the used I/O pins is chosen for the constrained area in order to avoid long nets to
the I/O pins. Such nets might elsewise generate a huge number of very low utilized additional
frames, which must be also checked during scrubbing.
To avoid net routings leaving the allocated area and generating additional essential frames,
we constrain also the routing. This can be done by blocking all routing resources outside the
allocated area by using so-called blocker macros. Such macros can be generated automatically
by a floorplanning tool such as GoAhead [4].
The result is a densely placed and routed design where almost all used frames are clustered
together. By improving the utilization of frames, also the number of essential frames Nfr,used is
reduced. Another advantage is that the scrubbing may be executed on contiguous regions and
without any holes in between. Such holes, which typically result from unconstrained placements,
might generate additional scrubbing overhead when using blind scrubbing without readback.
If the configuration memory cannot be subsequently written, the scrubber must include an
additional configuration header which addresses the frame which should be written next [37].
7 Design Flow
Our approach is applicable to many Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs. The following proposed design
flow, as illustrated in Fig. 4, is based on the Xilinx design tool ISE 14.2, on our own netlist
analysis tool, and on the low-level FPGA design tool GoAhead [4] which is used for macro
generation. Moreover, we use the Xilinx LogiCORE Soft Error Mitigation (SEM) IP core [11]
to implement a scrubbing controller which can detect and correct SEUs in the configuration
memory.
The entry point of the proposed design flow is the netlist after synthesis which consists of cell
instances and nets given in the Xilinx proprietary ngc netlist format. This ngc file is converted
into the EDIF file format and forwarded to the netlist analysis tool. In addition, the netlist is
fed into the implementation stage of the standard Xilinx design flow.
The netlist analysis tool converts the netlist into the graph G(V,E). From this graph, all
critical cell instances and nets in the netlist as described in Section 6.1 are extracted. The
resulting critical cells instances and nets are recorded into a Xilinx FPGA Editor scr script
file5. Furthermore, for all cell instances ρ, placement constraints are generated and recorded
5Exceptions are the nets of clock and reset signals which are ignored during our automatic netlist classification but are
marked as critical nets in the Xilinx FPGA Editor scr script file. Furthermore, wildcard characters * and ? are
selectively used to tolerate renaming of nets and cell instances during the MAP and PAR optimizations steps.
9
frames containing essential
and critical con!guration bits
frames containing unused
con!guration bits
FF
LUT
LUT
a)
b)
Figure 3: Illustration: a) a standard placement and routing of a given circuit and b), our area
constrained partitioning and floorplanning. By comparing a) and b), the number of
occupied frames is reduced from Nfr,used = 22 to Nfr,used = 13 frames. Moreover in
b), the cell instances and the routing are aligned to the frame boundaries and placed
near to the I/O buffers located in the center of the FPGA [32].
into the Xilinx User Constraint File (ucf ). These placement constraints are arranged such that
the number of occupied frames Nfr,used is minimized. This is done by aligning the targeted area
for implementation of the circuit to the frame boundaries. Moreover, this area is placed next
to the fixed I/O buffers in order to avoid long routing lines.
In the implementation stage, the ncd netlist is first translated and mapped to the specific
resource instances ρ of the FPGA by using the Xilinx tools ngdbuild and map, respectively.
Afterwards, blocker macros are generated and added to the design via the tool GoAhead in order
to occupy the routing resources outside the specified area. Without blocking these resources,
the Xilinx router might use these resources and generate additional low-utilized frames. After
adding blocker macros, the design is placed and routed by the Xilinx par tool. Subsequently,
the blocker macros are removed again by executing an FPGA-Editor script file, prepared during
the generation of the blocker macros.
To identify essential configuration bits Be and critical configuration bits Bc stemming from
the corresponding essential and critical resource instances and nets, we use the Xilinx bitgen
tool. A bitfile mask for the essential configuration bits Be can be generated directly by bitgen
using the option parameters -g essential. The resulting ebd file which stores for each configura-
tion bit the information if a bit is essential or not, can be directly used by the Xilinx SEM IP
core. To identify the critical bits, we may use the filter function of bitgen as described in the
Xilinx Application Note 538 [17]. In this application note, so-called prioritized essential bits are
introduced which are associated with one or more manually chosen hierarchical modules in the
circuit description. To generate an ebd file which only consists of critical bits from the chosen
modules, bitgen is executed using a filter file. This filter file consists of all resource instances ρ
(slices and nets) which belong to the chosen modules. For the proposed approach, we use this
filter file to store all critical slices and nets which are automatically identified by the method
described in Section 6.1. To identify all critical resource instances ρ of type τρ = slice from the
critical cell instances v ∈ V , we use a script generated by our analysis tool which is executed
on the routed netlist by the Xilinx FPGA Editor.
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Figure 4: Proposed design flow: The partitioning between essential and critical bits is done
in the netlist analysis tool. Furthermore, the floorplanner to minimize the number
of occupied frames is controlled by the ucf generated by the netlist analysis tool
by defining area constraints for the cell instances and by so-called blocker macros
generated and added by GoAhead. The information about the locations of the essential
and critical bits are stored in the ebd files essential.ebd and critical.ebd which are
generated by the Xilinx bitgen tool.
The results are two different ebd files, one for critical and one for essential bits. These ebd
files or their containing information may be stored in external and may be used to implement
a scrubber which verifies only used frames and finally, initiates state-restoring actions only if a
fault on a critical bit has been detected.
8 Configuration Bit Classification through Fault Injection
In order to evaluate the results of our systematic approach for configuration bit classification in
essential and critical bits, we implemented a fault injection approach (see Figure 5). In the past,
different fault injection approaches were sucessfully applied to emulate the effects of SEUs in the
SRAM cells of the configuration memory [21, 2, 35, 24, 18, 25]. The fault injection approach
in [25] classifies the configuration bits into sensitive and persistence bits which is analogous
to the essential and critical classification. Our fault injection approach is a straight-forward
implementation and can be implemented on all modern Xilinx FPGAs without any need of
off-chip hardware components. For the evaluation, we implemented the benchmark circuit in
a constrained area of the FPGA and compared the results with a replicated reference circuit
implemented in a distinguished area. Faults are injected with the help of a MicroBlaze softcore
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Figure 5: The architecture of the FPGA-based fault injection approach. Faults are injected in
the configuration of the circuit under test over the ICAP interface. The reference
design and the circuit under test are stimulated with identical inputs from the pseudo
random number generator (PRNG). A comparator compares the result of both circuits
and signals an error to the fault injection software, running on the MicroBlaze.
processor by reading back one configuration frame of the circuit under test over the internal
configuration access port (ICAP), toggle a single bit, and a write back to the original location
within the configuration memory. It is very important to spatially separate the circuit under test
and the reference circuit into different clock regions which corresponds also to different frame
addresses. Otherwise, the fault injection might affect also the reference design and, therefore,
falsify the result. Both circuits are stimulated with the same input pattern, produced by a
pseudo random number generator.
In order to determine the essential and critical bits with fault injection, every configuration
bit of the constrained area on which the circuit under test is implemented must be toggled with
subsequent evaluation of the impact. This is done at follows: First, the circuit under test and
the reference design is reset. The fault is injected in the corresponding configuration bit by
reading back the corresponding frame, toggle the bit, and write it back into the configuration
memory. After that, the circuit under test and the reference circuit process input data stemming
from the pseudo random number generator for a specified time. The outputs of both circuits are
compared and if a mismatch is discovered during the processing, the corresponding configuration
bit is marked as essential. After that, the error-free frame is recovered in the configuration
memory and the testing sequence is replayed without reseting the circuits by reseting only the
pseudo random number generator. If an error occurs even on the now error-free configuration,
the configuration bit to test is additionally marked as critical. Finally, both circuits are reset
and the next configuration bit is evaluated. This is repeated until all configuration bits in the
constrained area are tested. The corresponding test program which implements the described
procedure is implemented on the MicroBlaze processor.
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9 Experimental Results
The design flow described in Section 7 was applied to a subset of 20 benchmark circuits from
the MCNC suit obtained at [13]. Only circuits with flip-flops were considered. Additionally,
we choose a LMS equalizer, a floating-point unit (FPU), an AES 128-bit cipher implementation
and a (204,188)-Reed-Solomon Decoder from Opencores.org [26]. For our experiments, the
circuits were implemented for the Virtex-6 XC6VLX240T FPGA. In the following, Subsection
9.1 shows our results regarding the floorplanning and Subsection 9.3 shows our results regarding
the MTTR.
9.1 Reducing the number of used frames Nfr,used
In Table 1, the benchmark designs are characterized in terms of utilized LUTs, flip-flops, I/O
buffers and the number of frames Nfr,FF which contain the configuration bits of the utilized flip-
flops6. Furthermore, the table shows the number of identified essential bits ne, the number of
identified critical bits nc, the ratio nc/ne for the case that no additional placement and routing
constraints are used. In Table 2, the numbers of occupied frames Nfr,used are depicted for the
case a) that no placement and no routing constraints are used, for the case b) that placement
constraints and no routing constraints are used, and for the case c) that placement and routing
constraints are used. The last two columns show the reductions of the number of used frames
Nfr,used when case c) is compared to case a) and case b), respectively.
The approach in [31] uses only placement constraints which corresponds to our case b).
Therefore, the comparison between case b) and c) in the last column of Table 2 depicts our
improvement over the approach in [31] by using additional routing constraints.
Table 1: Benchmark circuits with used LUTs, flip-flops, IO Buffers, the number of frames Nfr,FF
containing configuration bits of user logic flip-flops, the number of essential and critical
bits.
Circuit LUTs FFs IO Buffers Nfr,FF ne nc nc / ne
MCNC benchmark circuits
bigkey 536 224 426 33 279584 250737 0.897
diffeq 555 248 31 15 205813 205813 1
elliptic 109 63 5 8 112832 112832 1
frisc 1889 822 136 23 529562 527779 0.997
s38417 2188 1263 135 37 502052 411022 0.819
s38584.1 1693 1140 342 41 465790 386888 0.831
tseng 478 221 174 19 216002 196154 0.908
Opencores benchmark circuits
LMS equalizer 231 206 34 96 156264 156264 1
FPU 8007 553 110 171 1713480 1680509 0.981
AES 128-bit 10450 10769 389 316 2387020 2372907 0.994
(204,188)-RS
decoder
3808 2735 21 183 883437 858757 0.972
6There are no embedded multipliers or BRAMs instantiated in the benchmark designs. While our autmatic netlist analysis
approach may apply to embedded multipliers, it does not apply to BRAMs since the associated content of the SRAM
cells is altered during circuit operation and cannot be scrubbed.
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Table 2: Benchmark circuits from Table 1 with the number of occupied frames without (a)) and
with placement constraints (b)) and with placement and routing constraints (c)). The
last two columns show the reductions of the number of used frames Nfr,used when case
c) is compared to case a) and case b), respectively.
Circuit
Nfr,used
for a)
Nfr,used
for b)
Nfr,used
for c)
∆Nfr,used in (%)
comparing c) and a)
∆Nfr,used in (%)
comparing c) and b)
MCNC benchmark circuits
bigkey 4201 2393 1891 43 21.0
diffeq 1332 602 602 54.8 0.0
elliptic 912 395 395 56.7 0.0
frisc 1960 1292 1050 34.1 18.7
s38417 2027 1389 1389 31.5 0.0
s38584.1 3192 2270 1863 28.9 17.9
tseng 1924 1298 1054 32.5 18.8
Opencores benchmark circuits
LMS equalizer 2051 1563 1120 23.8 28.3
FPU 4117 3520 3280 11.5 6.8
AES 128-bit 6822 6657 6335 2.4 4.8
(204,188)-RS
decoder
4610 4073 3761 11.6 7.7
It can be seen that by comparing case c) to case a), the number of occupied frames can be
reduced by up to 59% by using placement and routing constraints and by comparing c) to b),
the number of occupied frames can be reduced by up to 23.7% just by using additional routing
constraints. These gains directly affect the achievable MTTD as well, since according to Eq. (6),
the MTTD is linearly dependent on the number of occupied frames. Nevertheless, the achievable
gains may vary considerably from design to design and depends on the distribution of the used
I/Os. Furthermore, our experiments show that either no (0%) (complete combinatorial circuit)
or between 81.9% to 100% of the essential bits are also critical bits in the analyzed circuits.
But nevertheless, in case of the circuit s38417, if an SEU occurs on a used configuration bit,
there is still the probability of 18.1% that no state-restoring action has to be carried out after
scrubbing.
Fig. 6 illustrates our floorplanning strategy for one of our benchmark designs. Fig. 6a)
shows the placed, but unrouted design. The placement constraint is highlighted by the black
frame which is aligned to the frames of the middle left clock region. It can be seen that many
wires have to be routed from the I/O buffers of the left side to the I/O buffers in the middle.
Therefore, as shown in Fig. 6b), blocker macros are generated with the tool GoAhead to force
the wires to be routed through the middle left clock region. This is done to raise the frame
utilization7 in this area and to minimize the additional frames occupied by routing resources.
Fig. 6c) shows the final optimized design without the removed blocker macros, in which all
routing wires are mainly routed through the desired clock region. Note that placement and
routing constraints have also an effect on the timing. The effect depends on the size of the
constrained area, the circuit and the desired clock frequency. The decrease of the maximum
clock frequency is usually below 10% (see also [14]).
7The normalized frame utilization of one frame is defined the ratio of the number of essential bits to the total number of
configurations bits in a frame.
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Figure 6: Illustration of our floorplanning approach applied to one of our benchmark circuits.
In a), the unrouted, but placed design is shown. The placement area is highlighted
by the black box. In b), the blocker macros are shown which impose the routing
constraints. In c), the placed and routed design is shown.
Fig. 7 shows two diagrams of the frame utilization for the benchmark design bigkey. Fig. 7a)
illustrates the frame utilization without using any special placement and routing constraints,
and Fig. 7b) illustrates the frame utilization with placement and routing constraints. The
frames in both diagrams are sorted in descending order from left to right regarding to the frame
utilization with essential bits. It can be seen that the essential bits are grouped in less frames
and that, in general, the utilization of the frames containing essential bits is higher when adding
our placement and routing constraints.
9.2 Comparison to Fault Injection Approach
The netlist configuration bit classification method is compared to the fault injection approach,
described in Section 8. Hereby, we selected the three largest MCNC benchmark circuits (frisc,
s38417, and s38584.1 ) for comparison (see Table 3). We count only the essential bits ne and
critical bits nc for the constrained area in which the circuit under test resides. Therefore, the
number of determined essential and critical bits of the netlist method ne and nc differ to the
values in Table 1. The reason for the smaller number of essential bits in Table 3 might be the
missing long connections to the I/O cells and the more dense packing.
Table 3: The results of the classification by fault injection method of three selected benchmark
circuits. First, the numbers of essential bits ne and critical bits nc detected by the
netlist and fault injection method are shown. Furthermore, the ratios between essential
and critical bits detected by the fault injection and the netlist method are presented.
Circuit netlist netlist fault injection fault injection fault injection vs. fault injection vs.
method ne method nc method ne method nc netlist method ne netlist method nc
MCNC benchmark circuits
frisc 338218 337542 30977 5215 9 % 1.5 %
s38417 311584 255810 17677 457 6 % 0.2 %
s38584.1 313059 261091 160008 0 51 % 0 %
The constrained area has the height of one clock region and the width of up to 8 CLB
columns. This results in up to 746,496 configuration bits which have to be evaluated. For
each configuration bit, the test sequence consisting of 1 million input vectors, generated by the
pseudo random number generator has to be applied twice (see Section 8). The overall test time
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Figure 7: The diagrams show the frame utilization of the benchmark circuit bigkey for the
case that no special placement and routing techniques are used (a)) and for the case
that our proposed placement and routing constraints are used (b)). The frames are
sorted according to their frame utilization in terms of the number of essential bits in
descending order. Due to the placement and routing constraints, the number of occu-
pied frames Nfr,used is reduced from 4201 to 1891 and, therefore, the frame utilization
shown in b) is higher.
for one core is up to 20 hours.
The values in Table 3 show that only a subset of thenetlist method’s essential bits is found
by the fault injection method. The reason is that the essential bits determined by Xilinx Bitgen
is a worst case estimation. For example, if only two inputs of a LUT are used, most bits are
not used whereas Bitgen will classify all configuration bits belonging to this LUT as essential.
Moreover, due to circuit inherent redundancy and false paths, a lot of errors are masked and
have, therefore, no impact on the outputs. However, the one million input test vectors are far
away to be enough to discover all possible configuration faults which lead to a circuit failure.
Moreover, the number of found critical bits is much lesser than the number of found essential
bits. Here, only a small fraction of the determined bits from the netlist method is identified.
To understand this behavior, we have to emphasize that the netlist method categorize all bits
belonging to feedback paths as critical and essential. The experiment for determining the
essential bits with the fault injection method shows, that only a small part of essential bits
which were found by the netlist method has the ability to corrupt the output due to the above
mentioned masking effects. However, we applied one million test vectors whichmeans that the
fault has plenty of time to corrupt at least one single bit in one output vector, but during the
second run which identifies the critical bits, only the falsified states in the registers at the end
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of the first run has the ability to corrupt the outputs. It could also be the case that the state
in the registers during switching from the first to second run was correct and an error on the
outputs occurred much earlier during the first run. Even if the state is actually wrong, the
falsified state might has no effect on the following states due to the above mentioned masking
effects. This shows us that the results of the fault injection methods, especially for the critical
bits, have to be handled with care.
On the other hand, all discovered critical and essential bits by fault injection are also included
in the set of essential and critical bits of the netlist method. Therefore, the netlist method is
surely an overestimation, but by using this method, we can be sure that we will find any
configuration fault which leads to a failure. By avoiding the time-consuming tests of the fault
injection method which must be applied after each new place and route iteration, the proposed
netlist analysis is easy to use and produces very fast the corresponding result.
9.3 MTTR Analysis
In order to calculate the MTTR, we assume a scrubbing system with checkpointing as described
in [31]. Additionally, we assume that this system uses the SEM IP core [41]. All calculations
rely on the duration times given in [41]. The SEM IP core can be directly used to support
our classification approach of critical bits. However, the original SEM do not support selective
scrubbing approach. To also support this feature, the core has to be modified. The original
SEM IP core requires 459 LUTs and 383 flip-flops.Our experimental scrubber core with our
SEM IP Core modifications requires 2706 LUTs and 2176 flip-flops.
As illustrated in Fig. 8, we assume that the occupied frames of the configuration memory
are continuously scanned for SEUs and checkpoints CKPk with the time index k are created in
intervals equal to the scan duration Ps with Ps = Nfr,used · tcheck. If a non-critical essential bit is
corrupted, as illustrated in Fig. 8 a), the scrubbing system needs on averaged the time MTTD to
detect the corrupted frame and repairs the corresponding bit with no further action, afterwards.
The corresponding repair time trepair,e of an essential but non-critical bit includes the time to
determine the corrupted bit within the corrupted frame and the time to write the repaired frame
data into the configuration memory. However, if a critical bit is corrupted, as illustrated in Fig.
8 b), the system state is rolled back to a valid checkpoint after the detection and correction of
the corrupted bit. The system is rolled back to the checkpoint CKPk−1 under the assumption
that the corrupted critical bit has been detected after the checkpoint CKPk. Therefore, at least
the two past checkpoints CKPk and CKPk−1 have to be saved [31]. The repair time trepair,c of
a critical bit is in general greater than trepair,e since trepair,c further includes the classification
time to check if the corrupted bit is indeed a critical configuration bit, e.g., by evaluating an
ebd file stored in external memory. In a frame, which contains essential bits, every SEU has
to be corrected even if the SEU occurred on an unused bit since the frames are corrected by
an evaluation of the ECC parity bits which can only correct one error per frame. Therefore,
no accumulation of SEUs is allowed8. However, SEUs on unused bits do not contribute to the
MTTR because the implemented circuit is not damaged. After a detected SEU on an essential
bit, the criticality has to be determined (classification time). This step is always performed,
however it contributes only to the MTTR if the SEU occurred on a critical bit, because after the
correction of an essential non-critical bit, the circuit is again fully functional9. In order to set
the registers into the state of the checkpoint CKPk−1, the configuration bits of all used flip-flops
8Our approach may be also applicable to multiple bit upsets as long as there is at most one bit-flip in one frame of the
configuration memory.
9The ebd file with the essential bits is just needed to determine the frames which have to be scrubbed. Only the ebd with
the critical bits is used for classification.
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have to be set to the stored register values. Therefore, Nfr,FF frames have to be re-written after
trepair,c.
For our analysis, we assume that re-writing one frame to restore the state of a checkpoint
requires the duration of two times tcheck which on the one hand includes the overhead to write
the frame with the mask bit to restore the corresponding flip-flops values and which on the
other hand also includes the overhead to update the ECC parity bits. Therefore, we define
trestore = 2 · tcheck ·Nfr,FF. Furthermore, the rollback to the checkpoint CKPk−1 induce tlost =
Nfr,used · tcheck which equals the time to reach the state of CKPk. In case of a corrupted essential
bit that is non-critical, we set trestore and tlost to zero, since we assume that the system tolerates
errors induced by a corrupted essential but non-critical bit and recovers after correction on its
own. For our calculations of the MTTR, we propose the following equation:
MTTR =
(
ne − nc
ne
)
· (MTTD + trepair,e)
+
(
nc
ne
)
· (MTTD + trepair,c + trestore + tlost) . (7)
According to the product guide of the SEM IP core [41], we set the repair time of essential bits
trepair,e = 490µs and the repair time of critical bits trepair,c = 1100µs which additionally includes
610µs for the classification. Furthermore, we obtain tcheck = 810ns which is determined by the
frame size of 2592 bits, the ICAP interface word size of 32 bit and the ICAP frequency of 100
MHz.
In Table 4, we compare the MTTR of four different types of scrubbing controllers: a) scrub-
bing without any classification, b) scrubbing with classification of unused and essential bits, c)
scrubbing with classification of used, essential, and critical bits, and d) scrubbing with classifi-
cation of used, essential, and critical bits and with placement and routing constraints. For the
type a) the scrubbing controller continuously scans the whole configuration memory consisting
of Nfr,total = 22261 frames and initiates a reset with rollback after each error correction. Since
we use a rather huge FPGA device for our small benchmark circuits, the application of this
scrubber is not reasonable for our evaluation, but the MTTR is given for the sake of complete-
ness10. A scrubbing controller of type b), scans only the occupied frames, but also initiates a
reset with rollback even if the corrupted bit is non-critical. The scrubbing controller of type
c) only scans the occupied frames and only initiates a reset in case a critical bit is corrupted.
We finally suggest and compare a scrubbing controller of type d) which also uses classification
but just scans a reduced set of frames due to the placement and routing constraints. In this
analysis, the scrubbing controllers of type a) and b) treat every corrupted configuration bit as a
corrupted critical configuration bit. Apparently, our proposed approach clearly outperforms the
scrubbing controller types a) and b). If it is possible to reduce the number of occupied frames
by using placement and routing constraints, then d) outperforms c) as well. In comparison to
type b), which can be seen as a standard scrubbing controller, the savings regarding to the
MTTR are up to 48.5% for our benchmark circuits.
Table 4 brings out that the savings regarding the MTTR heavily depends on the circuit.
Furthermore, by analyzing complex circuits and circuits with a high utilization of the FPGA
device, most of the essential bits will indeed be identified as critical bits. This is especially true
for circuits which are not datapath-intensive.
10The main part of these huge MTTRs are the terms MTTD and tlost which corresponds directly to Nfr,total
and needs MTTD + tlost = 27137µs. For the smallest available Virtex-6 FPGA, the XC6VLX75T, this time
is 9234µs.
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Figure 8: Illustration of the adopted checkpointing system, in which the checkpoints CKPk with
the time index k are created in time intervals equal to the scan duration Ps. In a), a
non-critical essential bit is corrupted by an SEU. The corresponding corrupted frame
is detected on average after the MTTD. Afterwards, the corrupted essential bit is
detected within the frame and repaired, which in total takes the time trepair,e. In b),
a critical bit is corrupted by an SEU. In this case, the system has to be rolled back
to the checkpoint CKPk−1 after the corrupted frame has been detected (MTTD) and
repaired (trepair,c). The rollback to the checkpoint CKPk−1 takes the time trestore.
Furthermore, it takes the time tlost = Ps until the state of checkpoint CKPk has been
reached again [32].
10 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we present two new methods to enhance common scrubbing techniques for SEU
mitigation: a) we apply a netlist analysis and the Xilinx tool bitgen to identify and distinguish
essential and critical bits in the configuration memory and b) we use placement and routing
constraints to align a given design to the frame boundaries in order to reduce the number of
occupied frames that are affected by scrubbing. We integrated these two methods into one design
flow, which is fully automated by script files. A comparison to an implemented alternative
classification approach using fault injection is given which shows that through the proposed
netlist analysis, time-consuming fault injection methods can be avoided to identify essential
and critical configuration bits. Furthermore, due to differentiation between unused, essential,
and critical bits, we can efficiently decide if an SEU in the configuration memory has to be
corrected at all or if an SEU demands a reset after scrubbing. As was shown by experiments, the
introduction of placement and routing constraints may not only help to minimize the number
of occupied frames, but also may reduce the MTTR for specific designs by up to 48.5% in
comparison to a standard scrubbing controller.
The proposed design flow and the two methods open many possibilities for future work.
As seen in the experimental results, the number of critical bits dominates the essential non-
critical bits on the most real world examples. However, error masking through exploitation
of redundancy mechanisms and subsequently voting are not considered in our netlist analysis.
This is also indicated by the comparison to the fault injection method which identify much
lesser bits as essential and critical. By the sophisticated usage of methods such as DMR and
TMR inside feedback loops, we are able to establish an error barrier to mask out an error by
voting before it can affect the state of the circuit permanently. This means that former critical
bits of these feedback loops might be transferred into non-critical bits which lowers the overall
number of critical bits in a design. This might be reached by using the STAR framework [34].
For such designs we predict a higher benefit by using our proposed methodology to reduce the
MTTR.
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Table 4: Comparison of the MTTR for the considered benchmark circuits using four different
types of scrubbing controllers: a) scrubbing without any classification, b) scrubbing
with classification of unused and essential bits, c) scrubbing with classification of used,
essential, and critical bits, and d) scrubbing with classification of used, essential, and
critical bits and with placement and routing constraints. The last three columns show
the savings regarding the MTTR when type d) is compared to type a), type b), and
type c).
MTTR in [µs] ∆ MTTR in (%) comparing
Circuit for a) for b) for c) for d) d) and a) d) and b) d) and c)
MCNC benchmark circuits
bigkey 27590 6258 5838 3224 88.3 48.5 44.8
diffeq 27561 2742 2741 1855 93.3 32.3 32.3
elliptic 27550 2221 2221 1592 94.2 28.3 28.3
frisc 27574 3519 3511 2408 91.3 31.6 31.4
s38417 27597 3628 3203 2522 90.9 30.4 21.3
s38584.1 27603 5045 4492 3059 88.9 39.3 31.9
tseng 27567 3468 3266 2274 91.8 34.4 30.4
Opencores benchmark circuits
LMS equalizer 27693 3748 3748 2616 90.6 30.2 30.2
FPU 27814 5769 6379 5294 81.0 17.0 15.9
AES 128-bit 28049 9901 9861 9272 66.9 6.4 6.0
(204,188)-RS
decoder
27834 6998 6868 5856 79.0 16.3 14.7
Furthermore, we did not consider any circuits which utilize BRAMs or which implements
state-driven protocols to communicate with external peripherals, e.g., external memory. Both
the interfaces to BRAMs and the interfaces to external peripherals may lead to feedback cycles
which are not handled by our methodology so far. The consideration of memories will therefore
extend the scope of our work even further.
For newer Xilinx FPGA families, like 7-series and Ultrascales, the Xilinx design tool suite
Vivado has to be used. Our approach relies on the tool GoAhead [4] which uses the XDL
interface of the ISE design tools. However, a new version is under development which utilizes
the TCL interface of Vivado.
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